



Making an Empty Promise with a Quantum Computer

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Alice has made a decision in her mind. While she does not want to reveal it to Bob at this moment, she would like to convince Bob that she is committed to this particular decision and that she cannot change it at a later time. Is there a way for Alice to get Bob's trust? Until recently, researchers had believed that the above task can be performed with the help of quantum mechanics. And the security of the quantum scheme lies on the uncertainty principle. Nevertheless, such optimism was recently shattered by Mayers and by us, who found that Alice can always change her mind if she has a quantum computer. Here, we survey this dramatic development and its implications on the security of other quantum cryptographic schemes.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Cryptography — the art of sending secret messages — has a long and distinguished history of applications. The security of conventional cryptographic systems is often based on some computational assumptions such as the hardness of factoring of large composite numbers [1,2]. Remarkably, in 1994 Shor found an efficient *quantum* algorithm for factoring [3,4]. Consequently, much of the conventional cryptography will fall apart, if a quantum computer is ever built.

Interestingly, it has been proposed that quantum mechanics also comes to the rescue. In quantum mechanics, there is a well-known “no-cloning theorem” saying that an unknown quantum state cannot be cloned [5,6]. Consequently, eavesdropping in the quantum world will, in general, disturb the quantum state one is listening to. Thus, an eavesdropper can be discovered readily. Bennett and Brassard had shown in 1984 how quantum cryptography can be used to secure communications between two users against eavesdropping attack through the so-called quantum key distribution scheme [7]. This article does *not* concern quantum key distribution. Instead, we concentrate on a class of more fancy schemes, which are probably more useful in peacetime. The basic theme in those applications is the protection of private information during a public decision.

More concretely, in today’s world, sometimes we need to cooperate or negotiate with other people without trusting them completely. An example is long-distance (e.g. over the phone) coin flip . Suppose a divorced couple wants to decide who keeps the house by a fair coin flip. Nevertheless, they no longer trust each other. The problem is, therefore, how this can be done fairly without having to arrange a meeting or to trust a third party to flip the coin.

Before addressing the above problem, let us consider a simpler scheme. Suppose Alice has chosen a number either zero or one. And she wants to give Bob a piece of evidence that she has made up her mind in such a way that (i) Bob knows nothing about Alice’s choice at this moment; and (ii) Alice can no longer change her mind without being caught by Bob when she publicly announces her choice at a later time. This kind of task is called bit commitment [8].

Clearly, bit commitment can be used to achieve coin tossing. Alice commits to a bit — zero or one. Then Bob guesses which bit Alice has chosen. Finally, Alice opens her commitment by telling Bob which bit she has chosen. Bob verifies that Alice has been honest in executing the scheme. It turns out that bit commitment is a very important primitive in cryptography [1,9]. As will be discussed in later Sections, the security of conventional bit commitment usually relies on computational assumptions which can be broken in theory by exhaustive computer analysis. There had been a widespread belief that *quantum* schemes can get rid of computational assumptions, thus solving a long standing problem in cryptography.

The main focus of this review is the surprising result that this widespread belief has been misplaced. If Alice has a quantum computer, she can make an empty promise to Bob (i.e., Alice can change her choice at any time before she publicly opens her commitment) without being caught. This discovery represents a major victory of quantum cryptanalysts (i.e., code-breakers) over quantum cryptographers (i.e., code-makers). Finally, we remark that secure data transmission using quantum mechanics through the so-called quantum key distribution is unaffected by this new discovery.

II. BIT COMMITMENT — FROM THE ANCIENT TO THE POST-MODERN WORLD

A. Bit Commitment In The Ancient World

The first bit commitment scheme in history probably goes as follows: First, Alice writes down her choice on a piece of paper, puts it in a box, and locks it up. She gives the box to Bob, but keeps the key herself. Later on, she proves her commitment to Bob (which is called opening her commitment) by sending the key to Bob, who can then open the box and verify the value of her committed bit. Although this method is simple and straight-forward, there is a serious loophole. The security of this simple bit commitment scheme relies heavily on the physical security of the box and the lock. This is clearly not very useful in the electronic age.

B. Bit Commitment In The Modern World

Modern (non-quantum) bit commitment schemes rely on the idea of a one-way function — a function that is easy to compute, but very hard to reverse. For instance, multiplying two integers is easy, but there is no known *efficient* classical algorithm¹ to date for computing the factors of a large composite number [2].

In the modern world, a bit commitment scheme may go as follows (see Ref. [8] for discussions of various bit commitment schemes):

[Classical Bit Commitment Scheme]

1. Alice chooses her bit $b = 0$ to be committed to Bob.
2. If $b = 0$, she picks a random even number x and computes $y = f(x)$ where f is a one-way function. Similarly, if $b = 1$, she picks a random odd number y and computes $y = f(x)$. She sends y to Bob. This completes the commit phase.
3. To open her commitment, Alice sends x to Bob.
4. Bob verifies that $y = f(x)$ and checks whether x is odd or even. This verifies Alice's honesty.

The above bit commitment scheme (as well as all other variations) relies on the assumption that f^{-1} is hard to compute. Consequently, although Bob has received $y = f(x)$ in Step 3, he cannot invert the function f efficiently enough to get x and hence b in time. In other words, even though Bob has all the information he needs to compute b (and hence to know Alice's choice) before she opens her commitment, the hardness to compute f^{-1} effectively prevents him from doing so.

Nevertheless, no one has proven the existence of a one-way function [10]. Therefore, the security in this kind of bit commitment scheme is based on computational *assumptions*,

¹That is, an algorithm working on a classical computer.

which can be in principle broken either by exhaustive computer analysis, or by using more efficient algorithms.

To make the situation even worse, in 1994 Shor discovered an efficient quantum mechanical algorithm for factoring composite numbers [3,4,11]. His algorithm makes use of the quantum interference effect and massive quantum parallelism in quantum mechanics, which do not have any classical counterpart. Since it is a technological challenge to actually build a quantum computer, Shor’s result does not threaten classical bit commitment schemes immediately. However, the construction of a quantum computer is not forbidden at all by the laws of physics. One can envisage one day when quantum computer becomes a reality. Then, all classical bit commitment schemes will be unsafe.

C. Bit Commitment In The Post-Modern World

Following the pioneering works by Wiesner on “quantum money” and “multiplexing channel” [12], various quantum bit commitment schemes have been proposed [7,13–15]. There was a common belief just two years ago that quantum bit commitment is *absolutely* safe [13,16,17]. That is to say, even if both Alice and Bob have infinite computational power and can invoke quantum computers, any dishonest party will still be caught. The confidence on the security of quantum bit commitment is perhaps partly based on the following fact: if you are given a single unknown quantum state, then there is no way for you to tell exactly what that quantum state is. This is because measurement on an unknown quantum state is an irreversible process.

A number of quantum bit commitment schemes have been proposed [7,13–15]. Amongst them, the most well-known one is probably the BCJL scheme [13]. The detailed procedure of the BCJL scheme is irrelevant for our discussion. Nonetheless, for completeness, it is listed below.

[BCJL Quantum Bit Commitment Scheme]

1. Let ϵ be the average noise level of a quantum communication channel shared between Alice and Bob. Bob chooses a Boolean matrix G as the generating matrix of a binary linear (n, k, d) -code C such that the ratio $d/n > 10\epsilon$ and the ratio $k/n = 0.52$ and announces it to Alice.
2. Alice chooses a non-zero random n -bit string r and announces it to Bob.
3. Alice chooses a random n -bit codeword c from C such that the scalar product modulo two (i.e., the parity of the bitwise logical AND) between c and r is equal to the bit to which she is committed.
4. Alice picks a random n -bit string b . Suppose the i th bit of b , b_i , equals zero. Then she sends Bob her i th photon in the 0° or 90° polarization according to whether $c_i = 0$ or $c_i = 1$. Similarly, if $b_i = 1$, she sends Bob her i th photon in the 45° or 135° polarization according to whether $c_i = 0$ or $c_i = 1$.
5. Bob chooses a random n -bit string b' . He measures the i th photon that he receives from Alice in the 0° and 90° polarization basis if $b'_i = 0$. Otherwise, he measures the

i th photon using the 45° and 135° polarization basis. In either case, he writes down the measurement results.

6. To open her commitment, Alice reveals c , b and her committed bit to Bob.
7. Bob verifies that c is a codeword. Also, if both Alice and Bob use the same basis for transmission and measurement, then their results c_i and c'_i must agree in the absence of noise. Therefore, Bob verifies that the error rate in these cases is less than the acceptable value of 1.4ϵ . Finally, Bob checks that the parity of the scalar product modulo two between r and c is indeed Alice's committed bit. Bob accepts Alice's commitment only if Alice passes all the three tests above.

In spite of its apparent complexity, the essential idea behind the BCJL scheme can be readily understood. Alice encodes her commitment as some polarization of photons that is unknown to Bob. Thus, it is impossible for Bob to determine Alice's choice before she opens her commitment. Indeed, Brassard *et al.* [13] have already proven the security of the BCJL scheme against a cheating Bob. The alleged security of this scheme against a cheating Alice is, however, flawed. Mayers [18] and, independently, we ourselves [19] showed that Alice can cheat successfully if she has a quantum computer. As it turns out, the same cheating strategy can break not only all the existing schemes, but also *all* quantum bit commitment schemes [20–22] that one can possibly construct. So, let us tell you what the most general form of quantum bit commitment scheme is before proving that it is necessarily insecure.

III. INSECURITY OF QUANTUM BIT COMMITMENT

A. General Form Of A Quantum Bit Commitment Scheme

As will be argued in Subsection IIIC below, when appropriately formulated, the most general form of a quantum bit commitment scheme goes as follows [18–23]:

[General Quantum Bit Commitment Scheme]

1. Alice and Bob both initialize the quantum particles at their hands to a prescribed state.
2. Alice applies a unitary transformation to the quantum particles at her hand according to the value of her committed bit. Then she sends some of her quantum particles to Bob.
3. After receiving the quantum particles from Alice, Bob applies a unitary transformation to the quantum particles at his hand. He then sends some of his quantum particles to Alice.
4. Steps 2 and 3 are repeated finite number of times.
5. To open her commitment, Alice sends all her particles to Bob.
6. After receiving Alice's particles, Bob measures the composite system to verify Alice's honesty.

B. Unitary Description

Let us formulate the above description in mathematics.² Our justifications that the scheme is general will be made in Subsection III C. Let us denote the Hilbert spaces of Alice's and Bob's quantum machines by H_A and H_B , respectively. And the Hilbert space of the quantum communication channel is denoted by H_C . A quantum bit commitment scheme is executed in $H = H_A \otimes H_B \otimes H_C$. Initially, Alice prepares a state $|0\rangle_A$ or $|1\rangle_A$ according to the value that she would like to be committed to Bob. Bob prepares a fixed state $|v\rangle_B$ for $H_B \otimes H_C$. This is Step 1 of the general scheme. Consequently, the initial state is $|u_b\rangle = |b\rangle_A \otimes |v\rangle_B$ when Alice is committed to b ($b = 0, 1$). The two parties now take turns to perform unitary transformations (Steps 2–4). That is, in each step, a party $D \in \{A, B\}$ applies a unitary transformation on the system $H_D \otimes H_C$. Such a unitary transformation induces a unitary transformation on the larger space H .

The upshot is that the whole procedure of the commit phase, being a sequence of unitary transformations on H , can be summarized by a single unitary transformation U applied to the initial state on H . Such a unitary description will greatly simplify our discussion: At the end of the commit phase, Alice and Bob share a pure state, either $U(|0\rangle_A \otimes |v\rangle_B)$ or $U(|1\rangle_A \otimes |v\rangle_B)$. Also, since Alice and Bob know the procedure of the protocol, they also know U . So, once Alice opens her commitment by sending all her particles to Bob (Step 5), Bob can readily verify Alice's claim (Step 6).

Here we assume the most advantageous situation for Bob where during the opening phase Alice sends *all* her particles to Bob. We shall show that even then Alice can cheat successfully.

C. Generality Of The Above Description

Let us explain why the BCJL protocol falls into the above general scheme. Clearly, except for the selection of the error correcting code in Step 1, the BCJL protocol involves only one way communications from Alice to Bob. Also, sending photons with different polarization to Bob in Step 4 of the BCJL scheme is equivalent to first applying a unitary transformation to the initialized photons by Alice before sending them to Bob. Moreover, it does no harm for Bob to delay his measurement in Step 5 of BCJL until Alice opens her commitment.

At this point, readers may question if the above commitment scheme is the most general one. In particular, they may raise the following objections:

Question 1: Communications by classical means between Alice and Bob is not considered.

Answer 1: Since classical communications are a special case of quantum communications, they can be done on a quantum channel and there is no need to give them any special consideration.

²Mayers proved that all quantum bit commitment schemes are insecure in Refs. [20,21]. Here we will, however, follow our discussion of the same result in Refs. [22].

Question 2: Alice and Bob may measure some of their quantum particles in Steps 2– 4. Moreover, the unitary transformations they apply may depend on the results of their measurements.

Answer 2: Alice and Bob can delay their measurements until the opening of the commitment. For example, given a bit commitment scheme that involves a measurement by Alice and that Alice is supposed to apply a unitary transformation U_i to the rest of her quantum particles if her measurement result is $|e_i\rangle$ for some i . She can define another linear operator U which maps $|e_i\rangle \otimes |\Psi\rangle$ to $|e_i\rangle \otimes U_i|\Psi\rangle$ for each i . Clearly, U is a unitary operator. Therefore, Alice may choose to apply U to her quantum particles and *delay* her measurement until the opening phase.

Question 3: Alice and Bob may throw dice to decide which unitary transformation to use. Moreover, they may invoke ancillary quantum particles. More generally, Alice and Bob are dealing with density matrices, not wavefunctions.

Answer 3: Using the same argument in Answer 2, Alice and Bob can delay the throwing of the die (i.e., the state of the die is kept in a quantum superposition and does not collapse) until the opening phase. Any ancilla (including the quantum die) can be incorporated into Alice and Bob's quantum machines right at the beginning. This simply leads to an extension of the dimensions of the Hilbert spaces $H_A \otimes H_B$. Moreover, the state in the tensor product of these extended Hilbert spaces is *pure*. Notice that we are giving quantum computers to Alice and Bob. The key point of our argument is the following: We shall show that Alice can cheat successfully against Bob even if Bob has a quantum computer. It is then clear that Alice can cheat against Bob if Bob does not have one. We emphasize that, for the cheating to be successful, Alice generally needs a quantum computer to execute the appropriate unitary transformations.

Question 4: Instead of manipulating the quantum particles in turn, Alice and Bob may manipulate, send out, and receive their quantum particles in parallel. That is to say, Steps 2 and 3 are space-like events.

Answer 4: In practice, it is impossible to ensure that Alice and Bob receive signals simultaneously. This is because, for two distant observers, there is no way for one to be sure of the physical location of the other. (Recall that one of the two persons may be cheating.) More importantly, simultaneity has no invariant meaning in special relativity.

Having convinced ourselves that the above bit commitment scheme is the most general one, we turn to Alice's cheating strategy. First, we need a technical result.

D. Schmidt Decomposition³

Let H_A and H_B be Hilbert spaces with dimensions p and q , respectively. And let $|\Phi\rangle$ be any normalized state in $H_A \otimes H_B$. Define the density matrix $\rho = |\Phi\rangle\langle\Phi|$, and reduced density matrices $\rho^A = \text{Tr}_B \rho$ and $\rho^B = \text{Tr}_A \rho$.

Claim: $|\Phi\rangle$ can be written as

$$|\Phi\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^r \sqrt{\lambda_i} |a_i\rangle \otimes |b_i\rangle, \quad (1)$$

where $|a_i\rangle$ and $|b_i\rangle$ are orthonormal eigenstates of ρ^A and ρ^B , respectively. In addition, $r \leq \min(p, q)$ is the total dimension of the non-zero eigenspaces of ρ^A . This representation is called the Schmidt decomposition [25].

Proof: Any $|\Phi\rangle$ can be written in terms of the orthonormal eigenbasis $\{|a_i\rangle\}$ of ρ^A as

$$|\Phi\rangle = \sum_{i=1}^p |a_i\rangle \otimes |b'_i\rangle, \quad (2)$$

where $|b'_i\rangle$'s are not necessarily orthogonal. By taking a trace over H_B , we find

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Tr}_B |\Phi\rangle\langle\Phi| &= \text{Tr}_B \sum_{i=1}^p \sum_{j=1}^p |a_j\rangle \otimes |b'_j\rangle \langle a_i| \otimes \langle b'_i| \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^p \sum_{j=1}^p \sum_{k=1}^q \langle \hat{b}_k | b'_j \rangle |a_j\rangle \langle a_i| \langle b'_i | \hat{b}_k \rangle \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^p \sum_{j=1}^p \sum_{k=1}^q \langle b'_i | \hat{b}_k \rangle \langle \hat{b}_k | b'_j \rangle |a_j\rangle \langle a_i| \\ &= \sum_{i=1}^p \sum_{j=1}^p \langle b'_i | b'_j \rangle |a_j\rangle \langle a_i|, \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

where $|\hat{b}_k\rangle$'s form an orthonormal basis in H_B . Equating this to

$$\rho^A = \sum_{i=1}^r \lambda_i |a_i\rangle \langle a_i| \quad (4)$$

gives $\langle b'_i | b'_j \rangle = \lambda_i \delta_{ij}$. Hence, $|b_i\rangle = \lambda_i^{-\frac{1}{2}} |b'_i\rangle$ is an orthonormal set in H_B , and the Schmidt decomposition in Eq. (1) holds.

Similarly, by taking the trace of $|\Phi\rangle$ over H_A , we arrive at

$$\rho^B = \sum_{i=1}^r \lambda_i |b_i\rangle \langle b_i|. \quad (5)$$

Therefore, $|b_i\rangle$ is an eigenvector of ρ^B corresponding to the eigenvalue λ_i .

Q.E.D.

³The discussion in this Subsection is based on Ref. [25].

E. Alice's cheating strategy

Now, we show that the two basic security requirements of quantum bit commitment are inconsistent: In fact, if Bob cannot learn the value of the committed bit b , then Alice can almost always cheat successfully by changing the value of b at the beginning of the opening phase without being caught by Bob.

Consider the combined quantum state of the particles in Alice and Bob's hand just before the opening phase. We can include H_C to the quantum machine of whoever controlling the channel at this point. Therefore, $H = H_A \otimes H_B$ simply. When the committed bit, b , is zero, the state of the composite system can be written in Schmidt decomposition (see Eq. (1)) as

$$|0_{\text{final}}\rangle = \sum_i \sqrt{\alpha_i} |e_i\rangle_A \otimes |\phi_i\rangle_B . \quad (6)$$

On the other hand, when the committed bit, b , is one, it can be written in Schmidt decomposition as

$$|1_{\text{final}}\rangle = \sum_i \sqrt{\beta_i} |e'_i\rangle_A \otimes |\phi'_i\rangle_B . \quad (7)$$

The quantum state of Bob's particles, without the extra information coming from Alice, can be described by a density matrix obtained by taking a partial trace of the entire wavefunction over the particles at Alice's hand. If $b = 0$, Bob's density matrix is

$$\text{Tr}_A(|0_{\text{final}}\rangle\langle 0_{\text{final}}|) \equiv \rho_0^B = \sum_i \alpha_i |\phi_i\rangle_B \langle \phi_i|_B . \quad (8)$$

Similarly, if $b = 1$, Bob's density matrix is

$$\text{Tr}_A(|1_{\text{final}}\rangle\langle 1_{\text{final}}|) \equiv \rho_1^B = \sum_i \beta_i |\phi'_i\rangle_B \langle \phi'_i|_B . \quad (9)$$

In order that Bob has little chance to know Alice's choice in advance, we require the reduced matrices $\text{Tr}_A(|0_{\text{final}}\rangle\langle 0_{\text{final}}|) \equiv \rho_0^B$ and $\text{Tr}_A(|1_{\text{final}}\rangle\langle 1_{\text{final}}|) \equiv \rho_1^B$ to be as "close" as possible.

Let us first consider the *ideal* case when $\rho_0^B = \rho_1^B$. It then follows⁴ from Eqs. (8) and (9) that

$$\alpha_i = \beta_i \quad (10)$$

and

$$|\phi_i\rangle_B = |\phi'_i\rangle_B . \quad (11)$$

for all i . Substituting Eqs. (10) and (11) into Eq. (7), we get

⁴Here we assume that the eigenstates are non-degenerate. The case of degenerate eigenstates can be dealt with in a similar manner.

$$|1_{\text{final}}\rangle = \sum_i \sqrt{\alpha_i} |e'_i\rangle_A \otimes |\phi_i\rangle_B . \quad (12)$$

Let us consider the unitary transformation U^A which maps $|e_i\rangle_A$ to $|e'_i\rangle_A$. Notice that it is a *local* unitary transformation by Alice and as such can be implemented by Alice *alone*. Remarkably, it maps $|0_{\text{final}}\rangle$ to $|1_{\text{final}}\rangle$. In other words, Alice can always cheat by changing her bit from 0 to 1 just before she opens her commitment. More concretely, the cheating strategy goes as follows: She always executes the protocol for $b = 0$ during the commitment phase. At the beginning of the opening phase, she decides on the value of b that she would like to open. Suppose she decides $b = 0$ now, she simply executes the protocol honestly. On the other hand, if she now chooses $b = 1$, she applies U^A to her state. This changes $|0_{\text{final}}\rangle$ to $|1_{\text{final}}\rangle$. She can then declare that $b = 1$ and execute the opening phase for $b = 1$ accordingly. There is absolutely no way for Bob to defeat such an attack by Alice.

Having considered the ideal case, let us now, following Mayers [18], consider the non-ideal case where ρ_0^B differs from ρ_1^B slightly. In quantum mechanics, a good measure of the ‘‘closeness’’ between two density matrices is fidelity [24]. In general, given two reduced density matrices ρ_0^B and ρ_1^B of Bob, there are many possible systems A attached to Bob’s system B such that the *combined* wavefunction of systems A and B are pure states $|\Psi_0\rangle$ and $|\Psi_1\rangle$, respectively. That is, $\text{Tr}_A(|\Psi_i\rangle\langle\Psi_i|) = \rho_i^B$ for $i = 0, 1$. This kind of pure states $|\Psi_i\rangle$ are called *purifications*. The fidelity can be defined as

$$F(\rho_0^B, \rho_1^B) = \max(|\langle\Psi_0|\Psi_1\rangle|) , \quad (13)$$

where the maximization is taken over all possible purifications. Clearly $0 \leq F \leq 1$. Moreover, $F = 1$ if and only if there is a purification such that $|\Psi_0\rangle = |\Psi_1\rangle$, which in turn holds if and only if $\rho_0^B = \rho_1^B$. The closer the two reduced density matrices, the higher their fidelity.

Therefore, the requirement that Bob has little chance to know Alice’s choice in advance implies that

$$F(\rho_0^B, \rho_1^B) = 1 - \delta \quad (14)$$

for some small $\delta \geq 0$.

Here come two simple but crucial remarks. First, for any fixed purification $|\Psi_1\rangle$ of ρ_1^B , there exists a maximally parallel purification $|\Psi_0\rangle$ of ρ_0^B such that Eq. (13) is satisfied. Second, it can be proved that any two purifications $|\Psi_0\rangle$ and $|\Psi'_0\rangle$ of the same density matrix ρ_0^B are necessarily related by a *local* unitary transformation by Alice *alone*. These two facts follow trivially from the form of Schmidt decomposition in Eq. (1).

Let us apply these two remarks to non-ideal quantum bit commitment. From the first remark, given a purification $|1_{\text{final}}\rangle$ of ρ_1^B in Eq. (7), there exists a purification $|0'\rangle$ of ρ_0^B such that

$$\langle 0'|1_{\text{final}}\rangle = 1 - \delta . \quad (15)$$

From the second remark, there exists a *local* unitary transformation say U^A that maps $|0_{\text{final}}\rangle$ to $|0'\rangle$.

Now it is clear that, using the same cheating strategy as in the ideal case, Alice can almost always cheat successfully. In more detail, Alice’s cheating strategy goes as follows: Alice

chooses $b = 0$ and executes the commit phase honestly. During the opening phase, Alice decides the value of b to be opened. If she chooses it to be 0, she acts honestly. However, if she chooses it to be 1, she claims that $b = 1$ and applies the local unitary transformation U^A to change $|0_{\text{final}}\rangle$ to $|0'\rangle$. From Eq. (15), it is very hard for Bob to distinguish the state in the dishonest case, $|0'\rangle$, from the state in the honest case, $|1_{\text{final}}\rangle$. Therefore, Alice can almost always cheat successfully.

Notice that the cheating strategy makes essential use of entanglement. To succeed in cheating, Alice must be able to store quantum signals for a long time and to coherently manipulate quantum particles. That is, Alice generally needs a quantum computer.

At this moment, readers may ask why the no-cloning theorem and uncertainty principle cannot prevent Alice from cheating. The reason is simple: It is impossible for Bob to verify every unitary transformation and measurement that Alice has made. Therefore, Alice can delay making her unitary transformation $|0_{\text{final}}\rangle \rightarrow |0'\rangle$ till the opening phase.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

A. Secure Computations

Quantum bit commitment is a basic building block for many other quantum cryptographic protocols. After the fall of quantum bit commitment, the security of other quantum two-party protocols, in particular, the so-called two-party secure computations also came into question.

In a *one-sided* two-party secure computation, Alice with a secret x and Bob with a secret y would like to cooperate to compute a prescribed function $f(x, y)$ such that at the end, (i) Alice learns nothing (about y and $f(x, y)$); (ii) Bob learns $f(x, y)$; and (iii) Bob learns nothing about x except for what logically follows from y and $f(x, y)$.

One-sided two-party secure computations can, for instance, be used to prevent a fake teller machine from stealing a customer's PIN (Personal Identification Number): To do this, let x be the customer's (i.e., Alice's) PIN, y be the record of the customer's PIN in the teller machine (i.e., Bob). Consider the function $f(x, y) = \delta_{xy}$. Running the one-sided two-party computation of $f(x, y)$ will allow the teller machine to verify whether the customer's input x matches the record y of the teller machine. However, a fake teller machine does not know which y to use as the input. Using a random y will give it very little information about x .

The insecurity of quantum one-sided two-party secure computations was finally demonstrated explicitly by one of us [23], who showed that a cheating Bob can learn $f(x, y)$ for *all* values of y . This is a fatal violation of the security requirement. For instance, in the above password verification scheme such a cheating Bob will, by testing all possible values of y , learn the customer's input x .

A cheating Bob proceeds as follows: Bob inputs $y = y_1$, executes the protocol honestly and learns $f(x, y_1)$ by performing a measurement. He then applies a unitary transformation to change the value of y from y_1 to y_2 and learns $f(x, y_2)$ by performing a measurement. After that, he applies a unitary transformation to change the value of y from y_2 to y_3 to learn $f(x, y_3)$ and so on.

This cheating strategy works chiefly for two reasons. First, the measurement of say $f(x, y_1)$ in no way disturbs the state under observation. This is so because the state is an

eigenstate of $f(x, y_1)$.⁵ Second, the essence of the insecurity of quantum bit commitment is that if a party A knows nothing about the input b of another party B even at the end of the protocol, then B can cheat by changing b at the very end. Now since in a one-sided two-party secure computation Alice cannot learn about y , a cheating Bob can change the value of y . That is, the state of all quantum particles in Alice and Bob's hands when computing $f(x, y)$ and $f(x, y')$ are related by a unitary transformation involving only particles in Bob's hand [23], as required in the cheating strategy presented in the last paragraph.

In conclusion, quantum one-sided two-party secure computations are, *in principle*, insecure.⁶ Even though quantum bit commitment and quantum two-party secure computations are insecure *in theory*, they may still be secure *in practice*. This is because a cheater generally needs a quantum computer to cheat successfully. And it is a technological feat to build a quantum computer. The implication is that, by working with quantum protocols, one may replace classical computational assumptions with quantum computational assumptions.

B. Security Analysis of Composite Quantum Protocols

In the security analysis of quantum protocols, researchers usually only consider the case when a protocol is executed only once and in isolation. This is, however, contrary to the spirit that a cryptographic protocol satisfies conventional security requirements, which are usually written in terms of probability and thus implicitly demand that protocols follow the rules of inference in classical probability theory. Therefore, in analyzing quantum protocols a more refined security analysis than what is commonly adopted is needed [23]. In order to be able to apply classical probability theory to the study of a composite protocol, it is crucial to study the security of quantum protocols not only when they are used in isolation, but also when they are used as “black-box” primitives in building up more complicated protocols. It is only when they pass such a stringent test that they should be certified as secure.

Of course, such security analysis may be difficult to perform in practice. However, this is the price that one has to pay in asserting that a quantum scheme achieves a set of security requirements which are written in terms of classical *probability*.⁷

⁵This is because Bob is supposed to be able to determine $f(x, y_1)$ unambiguously. Here we are considering the ideal case. The non-ideal case where the state is only approximately an eigenstate of $f(x, y_1)$ does not change the essential argument [23].

⁶Another interesting protocol is quantum coin tossing, we have shown in Ref. [22] that *ideal* quantum coin tossing (that completely forbids successful cheating) is impossible. It is still open whether non-ideal coin tossing is achievable. It was also shown in Ref. [23] that quantum *two-sided* two-party secure computations are also generally impossible.

⁷The only alternative that we can think of is to describe the security requirements of quantum cryptographic protocols in terms of *probability amplitude*. Such an alternative has not been given serious consideration so far.

With this more stringent and, in our opinion, more accurate security analysis, classical inference is, by definition, valid. Since it is a standard result in classical cryptography that some two-party secure computations can be used to implement bit commitment [9], the impossibility of quantum bit commitment must immediately imply that quantum two-party secure computation is generally impossible.

C. Lessons We Learn

We remark that the attacks used by Mayers in Refs. [18,20,21], by Lo and Chau in Refs. [19,22] and by Lo in Ref. [23] as discussed in this paper, were not new. A weakness of a restricted class of quantum secure computation schemes (“multiplexing channel” [12]) as well as the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-type of attack [7] which underlines the insecurity of quantum bit commitment and secure computations had already been noted in some pioneering papers. What had not been fully appreciated until the work of Mayers [18,20,21] and ours [19,22,23] was the *generality* of such attacks.

Quantum mechanics is a double-edged sword in cryptology. While it apparently equips cryptographers with secure schemes of quantum key distribution⁸ due to the quantum no-cloning theorem, it also gives the quantum cryptanalyst the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen effect which allows him to delay his measurement and defeat quantum bit commitment and secure computations. Now on one hand, we generally believe that quantum key distribution is secure. On the other hand, quantum bit commitment and one-sided two-party secure computations have been shown to be impossible. A natural question to ask is: What is the exact boundary to the power of quantum cryptography? For instance, does quantum cryptography help multi-party secure computations? The answers to these questions may give us new insights on quantum information theory.

We must emphasize that the security of quantum key distribution is unaffected by the attacks described in this paper. Quantum key distribution alone should guarantee that quantum cryptography remains a fertile subject for future investigations. This is so particularly because of the dramatic recent progress in experimental quantum cryptography [34–38].

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⁸Despite many interesting approaches proposed in the literature [27–33], in our opinion, a widely accepted complete proof of the security of quantum cryptography in a noisy channel is still missing.

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